Can the Commission immediately suspend platforms that spread child-abuse material and harm users through addictive design, cyberharassment and AI chatbots?

► President
I open this deliberation in response to a public demand that the Commission act immediately and effectively — suspending, without delay, platforms that propagate child-abuse material and that harm users through addictive design, cyberharassment and AI chatbots. Let me be direct about both the moral force and the legal reality. The moral force is real: where platforms facilitate child sexual abuse material there is no balancing on the substance — that content is criminal and its removal is non-negotiable. The legal reality is that the Commission is not a content regulator that can switch a platform off by decree. We act under the Digital Services Act, whose enforcement is deliberately built on graduated steps, evidence and due process — so that our decisions survive challenge before the Court of Justice. A suspension that is annulled for procedural failure protects no child. The legal basis is Article 114 TFEU. The question is not whether to act — we are acting — but how to use the powers we have to maximum effect without exceeding them.
[EUR-Lex — verify DSA Regulation (EU) 2022/2065; Art. 114 TFEU]

► EVP · Digital
This portfolio leads. Let me set out precisely what the DSA gives us, because the demand for instant suspension misstates the mechanism, not the urgency. Child sexual abuse material is illegal content under Article 3; platforms must remove it on notice under Article 16, and very large platforms must mitigate systemic risks including illegal content and risks to minors under Articles 34 and 35 — enforceable by the Commission directly. The enforcement ladder runs from requests for information, to opening proceedings, to interim measures under Article 70 where there is urgency and serious harm, to non-compliance decisions with fines up to 6 percent of global turnover. Suspension is the last rung: under Article 82 the Commission may ask the competent national authority to seek a court order temporarily restricting access. It exists, but it is judicial, conditional and terminal in the sequence. My recommendation: the lawful answer to suspend immediately is interim measures and accelerated proceedings now, with suspension as the credible endpoint, not the opening move.
[EUR-Lex — verify DSA Arts. 16, 34-35, 65-74, 82; Art. 28]

► EVP · Democracy
Strong support for maximal action, with the rule-of-law discipline that is my mandate. Two things hold together. First, on child sexual abuse material and the protection of minors there is no free-expression defence for criminal content — act to the full extent of the DSA. Second, precisely because the stakes are high, the procedure must be unimpeachable: an Article 82 access restriction struck down for want of due process is a gift to the platforms. The online-safety agenda fully supports accelerated enforcement and interim measures. And cyberharassment engages victims' rights under the Charter as much as expression does — this is not a one-sided rights question.

► Commissioner · Justice
Support, legally precise. The Charter cuts decisively. Children's rights under Article 24, human dignity under Article 1, and the protection of the child are engaged on one side; freedom of expression and information under Article 11 on the other. For child sexual abuse material the proportionality analysis is short — there is no protected interest in criminal content, so removal and prosecution are required. For addictive design and lawful-but-harmful content the analysis is genuinely harder and must be evidence-based or the measure fails before the Court. My red line: enforcement against illegal content must be relentless; any restriction touching lawful content must meet the full proportionality test. The CSAM Regulation in trilogue must not introduce general monitoring contrary to DSA Article 8.
[CJEU — verify Art. 11 / Art. 24 Charter; general-monitoring prohibition DSA Art. 8]

► Commissioner · Home Affairs
Strong support, operational. Child sexual abuse material is serious crime, and the law-enforcement chain matters. Removal must be coordinated with preservation of evidence and referral to Europol and national authorities, or we delete the proof needed to prosecute the offenders. I want the enforcement line to pair DSA takedown with the criminal-justice response — suspension that scatters perpetrators without arrests is a poor outcome. Coordinate with Justice on the CSAM Regulation and with Europol on referrals.

► Commissioner · Internal Market
Support. The DSA is a single-market instrument and uniform EU enforcement is exactly the point — 27 national suspension regimes would fragment the market and weaken protection. Keep enforcement at EU level for the very large platforms through the Commission, coordinated with the national Digital Services Coordinators for smaller services. No reservation on the substance.

► Commissioner · Health
Support on the addiction limb, within competence. The mental-health harms of addictive platform design, particularly for adolescents, are a public-health concern, and ECDC and DG SANTE evidence can support the systemic-risk case under Articles 34 and 35. Public health is a supporting competence under Article 168, so my role is evidential, not regulatory: I can supply the harm evidence that makes a proportionate design intervention defensible before the Court.

► Commissioner · Trade
Reservation on method only. Several very large platforms are non-EU undertakings; enforcement against them, including any access restriction, will be read internationally and may surface at the Trade and Technology Council. The DSA applies to any platform serving EU users regardless of establishment — that is lawful and I defend it — but coordinate the external messaging so robust enforcement is not mischaracterised as digital protectionism. No objection to enforcement itself.

► Commissioner · Education & Culture
Support, with the media-literacy dimension. Enforcement is necessary but not sufficient; protecting minors online also needs digital-literacy and education action alongside the DSA measures. No reservation.

► President
I read the room. There is unanimity on the objective — no portfolio opposes acting to the full extent of the law against child-abuse material and platform harms to minors. The tensions are about method, not aim. First, the demand versus the instrument: immediate suspension is not the DSA's opening move; Digital, Justice and Democracy converge that the lawful and effective route is interim measures and accelerated proceedings now, with the Article 82 access restriction as the credible endpoint. Acting outside the ladder would hand platforms an annulment. Second, Justice's distinction between illegal content, where enforcement is relentless, and lawful-but-harmful content, where measures must be evidence-based and proportionate. Third, Home Affairs: takedown must preserve evidence and feed prosecution, not merely remove and scatter. Fourth, Trade: non-EU platforms are fully in scope, but coordinate the messaging. The only no in the room is a legal no to a power the DSA does not contain — not opposition to action. I record consensus to agree the College enforcement line; no formal vote.
[review — political judgement required on communicating suspension expectations]

Deliberation closed · 10 positions recorded